The Arctic This Week Take Five: Week of 24 November, 2025

Finland Seeks Greater Arctic Footprint Through New Arctic Foreign and Security Policy

Defense News shared on November 26 that Finland published its new Arctic foreign and security strategy. Presented on November 25, the document provides an update to Finland’s previous 2021 strategy. The new document mentions the growing role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the High North, in particular the NATO Forward Land Force Unit stationed in Northern Finland, and highlights the shifts in the US’ regional posture. Other topics include Finland’s commitment to the Arctic Council and sustainable economic development of the region. (Defense News)

Take 1: With its previous strategy dating from 2021, a time when Finland was not yet a NATO member and before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an update was urgently overdue. While explicitly framed as complementary to previous government documents, the 2025 policy reveals a recalibration of Finland’s regional posture. It reflects a growing self-perception of Finland as a proactive regional security actor and demonstrates its resolve to further establish and develop its role in the region. This is further illustrated by the prominence of NATO in the document – 27 mentions across 20 pages. Through the NATO Forward Land Force Unit in Northern Finland, the country is embracing a more militaristic posture in the region: during a crisis, the Unit would oversee planning, command, and control of land operations and defense across the wider Arctic. Finland’s geography makes these shifts particularly important: almost one third of Finland’s landmass is located above the Arctic Circle in Lapland, and the country has the longest NATO land border with Russia, rendering it a crucial actor in Arctic affairs. Recently, it hosted NATO’s first Arctic Space Forum, which centered around how situational awareness, resilience, deterrence, and awareness in the High North can be reinforced by space capabilities. This shows Finland’s growing recognition that regional security not only hinges on boots on the ground, but also on satellite surveillance and allied coordination. Overall, the updated policy cements Finland’s ambitions as a determined regional security actor rather than a cautious stakeholder. (Defense News, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU)

Russia Redeploys Supersonic Tu-22M3 Bombers to Kola Peninsula

The Barents Observer reported on November 25 that Russia has redeployed sixteen Tu22M3 bomber planes from its Belaya air base in Siberia to the Olenya air base close to Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula in the Russian Arctic. The distance between this air base and the Ukrainian border is about 1,800 kilometers, with the supersonic bomber planes having a range of about 2,400 kilometers. Its supersonic missiles, the Kh-22 and Kh-32, can each fly between 300 and 1,000 kilometers depending on modifications and warheads. (The Barents Observer)

Take 2: The redeployment of these bombers, representing more than half of Russia’s Tu22M3 arsenal, suggests a redefinition of Russia’s strategic posture, stretching the utility of long-range assets by positioning them on remote Arctic airfields. Analysts noted that this presents an unusually large redeployment of bombers over a great distance, suggesting a heightened urgency in Moscow’s war-planning calculus. When based at Olenya, these aircraft enable Russia to strike into Ukraine from its Arctic territory, emphasizing Russia’s ability to mobilize strategic assets far from theatres of immediate fighting. The high speed and altitude of these missiles renders them incredibly difficult to intercept due to reduced reaction and detection time, increasing their likelihood to get past Ukraine’s air defense system. However, there are some limitations attached to these bombers. The planes are very old, with initial deployment dating back to the 1970s, and the strikes are notoriously imprecise as their onboard missiles were initially developed as anti-ship weapons. As a result, their guidance and targeting systems are unsuited for precision attacks on land, resulting in higher risks of collateral damage or ineffective strikes. In other words, while Arctic positioning of strategic bombers gives Moscow flexibility and extends its reach, the actual operational impact might be limited. Ultimately, the redeployment serves more as a signal of the strategic utility of the Arctic as a platform for power projection than as a guarantee of effective precision strikes. (Aftenposten, Militarnyi, The Barents Observer, TSN)

European Space Agency Plans to Build Arctic Space Centre in Tromsø

SpaceNews announced on November 27 that the European Space Agency (ESA) and Norway have signed a letter of intent and launched a joint working group to establish a new ESA Arctic Space Centre in Tromsø, in Northern Norway. The center is envisioned to focus on telecommunications, Earth observation, and navigation, and will contribute to sustainable Arctic development through the delivery of space-based data. The structure and model of the facility will be developed by the working group over the course of 2026 with the objective of formally launching the center by 2027. (SpaceNews)

Take 3: Anchoring a dedicated, permanent ESA facility in the Arctic signals that the region is no longer a remote zone for seasonal research, but a crucial area that requires continuous monitoring and sustained infrastructure. Polar orbits in general are crucial for consistent Earth coverage, and space-based capabilities have become essential tools for advancing our understanding of the Arctic. ESA already has extensive experience in collecting Arctic data, and in August 2024, the Agency launched the Arctic Weather Satellite, controlled from Tromsø. Meanwhile collaborative networks such as the Svalbard Integrated Arctic Earth Observing System (SIOS) rely on satellite data from European initiatives like Copernicus Sentinels to support research across Northern Norway and Svalbard. Building on these capacities, the new center could support environmental protection, marine safety, and sustainable resource management by providing a permanent hub for data collection, processing, and distribution. However, Europe is not the only actor expanding its polar space footprint. For instance, Russia is developing the Arktika-M constellation, intended to monitor weather and ice conditions across Russia’s far north. Foreign actors such as China have also been increasing their presence, with China owning multiple satellite ground stations in the Arctic region, raising geopolitical and dual-use concerns. Embedding space infrastructure in the Arctic thus carries both opportunity and risk. Nevertheless, the planned Arctic Space Centre presents an important tool for Europe and Arctic communities to better understand regional change, grounding responses in robust data. (European Space Agency, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, SpaceNews)

European Parliament Calls on EU to Update Arctic Strategy

Energi og Klima reported on November 26 that the European Parliament has voted on and approved a resolution calling for an updated EU Arctic strategy. During the voting session on Wednesday, the resolution garnered a significant majority of 510 votes in favor, 75 against, and 80 abstentions. In the motion, the Parliament urges the European Commission to step up and develop a smart Arctic strategy, including full Arctic Council observership, while advocating for Norway, Iceland, and Greenland to join the Union. (Energi og Klima)

Take 4: Since the 2008 Communication on “The EU and the Arctic Region“, the European Parliament (EP) has been closely involved in shaping the EU’s Arctic policy, consistently calling for a coherent regional presence. The most recent 2021 Joint Communication “A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic” aligned the EU’s Arctic ambitions with broader climate and environmental goals. Still, its scope remained limited. Since then, the region has witnessed significant developments: Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO accession of Finland and Sweden, growing interest in Arctic shipping routes and resource potential, paralysis of the Arctic Council, rising militarization, and so on. Although its inaction has raised frustrations in the Arctic community, the EU is not oblivious to these changes. Its posture reminded of what the EU stands for and prioritizes in the region: environmental protection, sustainability, and Indigenous and local communities. After all, security and robust foreign policy discourse was relatively limited at the time. This has since evolved in response to, among others, Russia’s increasing inclusion of its Arctic territories in its war efforts, and the US’ more hostile discourse around Greenland. In its resolution, the EP takes stock of these challenges and now insists that the EU adopts a “robust, security-oriented strategy” to address military build-up, protect critical underwater infrastructure, secure navigation routes, and ensure resource and energy security. This could thus open an important new chapter of EU Arctic engagement with the Union as a more active and serious regional actor. (Arctic Today, Energi og Klima, European External Action Service, European Parliament, European Parliament)

Third Pan-Arctic Vision Takes Place in Iqaluit, Canada on 29 November

CBC News reminded on November 26 that the third edition of Pan-Arctic Vision is set to take place in Iqaluit, Canada this weekend. The cultural music event will bring together artists from communities across the Arctic world, including Alaska, Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Northern Norway (Sápmi), Northern Sweden (Sápmi), Yakutia, Murmansk, Pohjois-Suomi, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories. (CBC News)

Take 5: The third installment of Pan-ArcticVision (PAV) continues the event’s ambition to knit together a circumpolar cultural community that transcends politics. It shows that Arctic peoples are more than remote outposts, but part of a shared, vibrant identity. Pan-ArcticVision describes itself as “a Eurovision for the Arctic”, intending to unite local artists from across the High North under a common banner of music, community, and empowerment. Unlike many international competitions structured around nation-states, PAV intentionally frames itself around “regions and territories of the Arctic”, enabling participants from Alaska, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Sápmi, northern Canada, and the Russian Arctic to present their cultures, languages, and stories. The inclusion of Russian Arctic communities regardless of geopolitical tensions demonstrates that the pan-Arctic culture can transcend state conflict, allowing shared heritage, climate realities, and northern identity to find an outlet of common expression. The symbolic value of such gatherings should not be underestimated. The majority of global discussions about the Arctic are framed in political, environmental, or economic terms, presenting the Arctic as a frontier for resource extraction, strategic competition, or climate data. PAV, in contrast, reclaims the Arctic as a space of human experience, creativity, and community. As many Arctic territories are marginalized in mainstream global cultural arenas, PAV offers them visibility and a platform, reinforcing cross-border solidarity across the circumpolar North. (CBC News, CBC News, PanArcticVision)